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Introduction
The research program described in this report was
conducted in conjunction with a research project directed by
Dr. John A, Emrick. This project was designed to investigate
the validity of a test model for individualized instruction
and utilized concept learning tasks and examined acquisition
trends across levels of conceptual difficulty. The rationale
for this test model followed from a detailed examination of
decision rule logic in single skill testing. Furthermore,
this testing is considered a necessary and essential f eature
of nearly all individualized instruction programs. A more
detailed account of the specifics of this test model is
described by Emrick and Adams (1969) and also by Emrick (1971).
2The Concept Identification Task
The subject's task in a concept identification problem
traditionally has been described as involving at least two
components: the identification of the relevant dimensions
and the identification of the rule or rules which bring the
attributes together in a particular fashion (Bruner, Goodnow
and Austin, 1956; Haygood and Bourne, 1965; Bourne, 1968).
Given a set of dimensions a, b, c_. . .x each with n
values or attributes ( al , a2 , a3 . . . an ; bl , b2 , etc . ) the
subject's task is to learn which of these attributes satisfy
the conditions defining the concept. These attributes which
satisfy the concept definition are said to be relevant and
the dimensions to which they belong are called relevant di-
mensions. In a concept made by the attributes al, b2 and c3,
these attributes would then be the relevant attributes; all
other attributes ( including the remainders of dimensions _a,
b and c_) and all other dimensions are said to be irrelevant
to this particular concept
.
However, the learning or identification of a concept
goes beyond simple identification of relevant attributes.
Two or more quite different concepts might consist of iden-
tical attributes but differ in the way the latter are arranged.
For example, attributes al and b2 might be the relevant
attributes of two different concepts
,
namely "both al and b2
must be present" vs. "al or b2 must be present but not both".
3The particular arrangement of the relevant attributes of
a concept is known as the conceptual rule* Neisser and
Weene (1962) have shown that when the number of relevant
attributes is restricted to two, there are 10 such conceptual
rules* Table 1 describes these 10 possible conceptual rules.
Insert Table 1 about here
A substantial interest exists concerning the relative influence
of each of these two components — attribute learning vs .
rule learning — in the process of concept identification.
For the most part, research has concentrated either on
the identification of the relevant attributes (Hovland and
Weiss, 1953; Archer, Bourne and Brown, 195 5; Bourne and Hay-
good, 1959) or on the relative difficulty of different rules
(Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956; Neisser and Weene, 1962).
Research on attribute learning has demonstrated the
effects of such variables as the number of relevant and
irrelevant dimensions (Walker and Bourne, 1961) and the
amount of intra- and inter-dimensional variability (Battig
and Bourne, 1961). For example, Battig and Bourne's (1961)
investigation on the effects on error-rate of changes in the
number of dimensions and changes in the number of values
within each dimension revealed that college students made
more errors following both inter- and intra-dimensional
variations . Further, this relationship between error-rate
4and intra-dimensional variability was found to correspond
very closely to a straight line function.
The amount of irrelevant and relevant information has
also been shown to contribute to task complexity. Although
it would seem on an intuitive basis that increased relevant
information should increase the difficulty of the conceptual
task , it is not so obvious that increased irrelevant infor-
mation should do so . Actually , the amount of irrelevant
information affects only the complexity of the stimulus
pattern, since the number and type of categories into which
the patterns must be sorted will remain the same. Further,
Walker and Bourne f s ( 1961 ) study indicated an interaction
between the amount of both relevant and irrelevant infor-
mation and problem difficulty. Errors increased at a posi-
tively accelerated rate with increases in relevant information,
but this effect depended on the level of irrelevant infor-
mation employed in a problem.
Of principal interest to this proposal are the results
of research concerned with the learning of conceptual rules.
Neisser and Weene (1962), using the rules described in Table
I, demonstrated that rules are not of equal learning diffi-
culty even though they refer to the same set of attributes.
Neisser and Weene further showed that the different rules
fall logically into three categories or levels based on the
number of component elements. Table II shows the three
levels and the rules comprising each level. Their results
indicated that the degree of difficulty of each rule increased
from level to level, level I containing the easiest rules.
Insert Table 2 about here
Although the results seem hardly surprising, it is not
immediately clear why the different rules would distribute
themselves along this continuum of difficulty.
Several explanations have been offered in an attempt to
explain why certain rules are more difficult to attain than
others. One possibility suggested by Haygood and Bourne
(1965) is that subjects are forming and testing various rule-
hypotheses until the correct one is discovered. Thus, as
concept increases in complexity, more rules become available,
reducing the probability of an early solution. This expla-
nation is very similar to - if not the same as - the decision-
tree model suggested by Hunt (1962, cited by Haygood and
Bourne, 1965). It easily can be shown that the rules of
each level in Table II are built upon the rules of the
previous levels • Therefore , as one moves from one level to
another, larger samples of stimuli would be required to
eliminate competing rules, which is consistent with Hunt's
hypothesis. However, even though this may be true in some
cases, this explanation does not seem entirely satisfactory.
For one thing, it requires that subjects have all the rules
available, which may not necessarily be the case. For
6example, Haygood and Bourne (1965) and Bourne (1968) reported
that when naive subjects were given the relevant attributes
of a concept and were asked to identify it, subjects showed a
strong preference for conjunctive rules even though there
were no pre-established rules (i.e., any rule would define
the concept). Moreover, subjects seemed surprised at the
possibility that other rules might have been involved.
Another study reported by Neisser and Weene (1962) evaluated
this assumption of availability of rules. A computer was
programmed to identify concepts of varying difficulty (see
Table II) using a logical elimination strategy. The results
indicated that the time (number of steps) required for the
computer to identify each concept was inversely related to
the structural simplicity of the rule. These results strongly
imply that something other than - or in addition to - simple
logical elimination is involved in human concept identification
strategy.
Another hypothesis suggested by Neisser and Weene (1962)
concerns differences in difficulty of comprehension or verbal
expression within the various classes of rules. For example,
the authors found that rules within the second classification
were not of equal difficulty, two being very difficult. Also,
Haygood and Bourne (1965), working only with rules from the
second classification, showed that the rules differed in
relative difficulty. Yet this hypothesis of differential
7rule difficulty, even though plausible, still does not seem
to account for all the data. For example, Neisser and Weene
(1962) reported that subjects seemed to have better verbal
understanding of complex rules such as "either/or" than of
the more rapidly learned (i.e., "easier") category-2 rules.
In view of all these arguments, Neisser and Weene
(1962) suggest that their data can be better explained in
terms of a hierarchical organization. The hierarchy can be
seen by looking at the problems in Table II. For example,
compare three rules shown at the Table: (A), (A. -B) and
(A. -B) v (-A. B). According to Neisser and Weene (1962)
the facilitative effect of learning lower- level concepts
before learning more complex concepts lies in the fact that
to solve rule (A. -B) subjects must learn what (A) and (-B)
mean; following the same reasoning, learning (A. -B) will
facilitate learning of (A. -B) v (-A. B) . It thus appears
important to turn to the issue of hierarchical conceptual
learning
.
The Hierarchical Organization of Concepts
Neisser and Weene f s data tend to provide experimental
support for a theoretical model being developed by Gagne and
which is fully described in Gagne, 1965. Specifically,
Gagne' s model describes learning as increasing in stages of
complexity and difficulty in hierarchical terms. The
differential difficulty of concept learning for ostensibly
similar concepts — as reported by Neisser and Weene —
8corresponds well to his theoretical interpretation.
The basic working principle of Gagne's model is the
description of learning as a cumulative process. More
specifically, he states that "within limitations imposed by
growth, behavioral developments result from the cumulative
effects of learning" (Gagne, 1968, p. 178). This statement is
better understood if one considers the area of concentration
of Gagne's work and, within it, the type of learning which
constitutes his primary concern
.
It is perhaps not an understatement to say that Gagne
has been basically concerned with applied research and that,
for the most part, his work deals with instructional procedures
for the teaching of mathematical concepts (Gagne, 1962a, 1962b,
1963, 1965). In these works he has consistently shown that a
complex task can be broken down into its components such
that performance in each step of this sequence is dependent
upon mastery of the previous steps (for example, Gagne, 1962)
.
Another characteristic of Gagne 1 s model - and perhaps a
consequence of the ones above mentioned - is that it involves
mostly what he calls "rule" or "principle" learning. A rule
or principle is basically a concept but is distinguished from
the latter in that:
1. While attainment of a concept can be shown by means of an
identif icatory response (concrete concept or concept by
observation) the rule or principle has to be demon-
strated (abstract concept or concept by definition)
9(Gagne, 1966) .
2. A rule or principle is composed by associations, motor
and verbal chains, multiple discriminations, concepts,
and simple rules (in the case of complex rules)
(Gagne, 1965, 1968)
.
Gagne himself provides a clear example to illustrate the
distinction above. Suppose one is looking for a criterion to
judge whether or not a person has the concept "radius of a
circle". He might ask the person to draw the radius in a
circle or to identify which of several lines drawn in a circle
is the radius. But what criterion should one use to be sure
that a learner knows what "work" represents in physics?
There seems to be just one and that is to require the subject
to demonstrate that the work produced by a force exerted on a
body is the product of the force times the distance the body
is moved. Further, this implies that the learner must
appreciate or already knows such things as "force" , "dis-
placement", "multiplication" and the like.
One of the implications of a rule or principle (as
opposed to a concept by observation) is that it is not "learned"
but has to be taught (Gagne, 1966). The distinction here
seems to relate to the level of abstraction involved in each
of these two kinds of concepts. For example, one might
expect a subject to learn to identify the radius of a circle
even though he is not able to define what the radius of a
circle is . The relevant attributes of the concept are all
10
physically contained in the instance and can be isolated, for
example, simply by differential reinforcement. A rule or
principle, on the other hand, requires relational operations
that go far beyond the observable properties of the stimuli
(as, for example, in the principle of "work"). According to
Gagne, even in the case where the subject has mastered all
the discriminations and concepts involved in the rule, he is
not likely to demonstrate the rule if he has not been taught
it. Therefore, rule learning as defined by Gagne seems to
differ considerably from the process usually studied in
psychological research, which deals with what he calls con-
cept by observation.
Moreover, when one thinks of the concepts that constitute
a mathematical rule, it is apparent that the hierarchical
organization of information becomes an end rather than a
means. In the learning of the rule 2N-1, to learn what
means is not a facilitatory device but rather a prerequisite
(unless, of course, the rule is changed). This notion of
hierarchies comprised by prerequisites is recognized by
j
Gagne.
The hypothesis is proposed that specific
transfer from one learning set to another standing
above it in the hierarchy will be zero if the
lower one cannot be recalled and will range up to
100% if it can be. (Gagne, 1962, p. 358)
A close examination of Table II shows the difference
between rule learning as defined by Gagne and the process
described by Neisser and Weene (1962). In the latter,
subjects could learn rules from any levels independently of
previous mastery of rules from lower levels. For example,
subjects in Haygood and Bourne's (1965) study commenced with
level-II concepts and were quite able to learn them. It
might be argued, however, that level-I concepts in Neisser
and Weene's experiment consisted of the simple presence (or
absence) of an attribute and, therefore, were not different
from attribute identification tasks. Since one of the
conditions of Haygood and Bourne (1965) was learning of the
rules given the attributes, the task in both studies becomes
comparable
.
There is enough evidence, however, that rules can be
learned at any level independently of learning rules from
presumably subordinate levels. Haygood and Bourne (1965) and
Bourne (1968) have consistently shown that if subjects are
given training in discovering rules there is an
improvement from problem to problem much like the phenomenon
of learning set described by Harlow (1959). Moreover, Hay-
good and Bourne's (1965) study also included a condition in
which subjects had to learn both a rule and the attributes.
Although the performance of this group was considerably
poorer than that of the other two groups (rule learning with
attributes given and attribute identification with rule
given) there is no doubt that subjects did learn the task.
Therefore, although the relationship between Neisser and
Weene's results and the work developed by Gagne seems to
12
compliment each other, more basic research is needed in order
to clarify some of the problems involved in hierarchical
organization of concepts. For example, no satisfactory
definition of complexity has been given. While Gagne seems
to imply that complexity is a function of increasing the
number of subordinate rules and concepts assumed prerequisite
to the learning of some higher-level rule, Neisser and Weene
apparently show complexity as the addition of subsets of rule
Rationale for the Experiment
This project has been designed in order to further
investigate some of the variables involved in the learning
of hierarchically structured concepts
.
By setting up several levels of concept learning tasks
and by imposing a subordinate - superordinate relationship
within the relevant dimensions from level to level, it is
possible to make the conceptual tasks to correspond roughly
to the notion of a hierarchy as described by Gagne (1965)
and Neisser and Weene (1962). Thus, given a certain number
of dimensions, complexity across levels can be manipulated by
systematically varying the number of changing dimensions
and/or by increasing the number of such dimensions selected
as relevant to the problem. Table III shows three levels
constructed on the basis of the criteria of complexity given
above. There are several advantages in this procedure.
Insert Table 3 about here
First, it allows for elimination of the effects of the
relative difficulty of different rules. As it can be seen
in Table III, level-I concepts contain 3 varying dimensions,
one being relevant to the problem. Each subsequent level
builds on previous levels by adding new relevant dimensions
to the problems (level II adds one more dimension, level III
adds two more dimensions). Therefore, the transfer of learned
prerequisites from one level to another can be assessed in-
dependently of the effects of different rules.
Another advantage of this approach is that it allows for
evaluation of altering solution attributes within dimensions
across subsequent problem levels. Neisser and Weene's study,
for instance, failed to show what was the precise nature of
the transfer effects from level to level. The effects of
learning the rule ( A) should be more dramatically shown in
the learning of such a rule as (A. -B) than a rule as (-A. B).
In fact, Neisser and Weene (1962) were not able to account
for the fact that (-A) was more easily learned than (A).
Likewise, learning the rule (-A. B) should yield more positive
transfer to learning (A. -B) v (-A. B) than should learning
the rule (-A v B)
.
As it can be seen in Table III, the attributes of a
particular dimension may be kept constant or may be varied
across levels. Thus, dimension A is represented by values
2, 3 and 4, respectively, while dimension B remains constant.
In order to gain information about the effects of shifting
14
the attributes of the relevant dimensions from level to
level, each level can be subdivided into two groups: for
group 1, attributes remain constant whereas for group 2,
attributes vary across levels. Since both groups 1 and 2
have to solve problems based on the same rules, transfer
effects from level to level should be higher for group 1 than
for group 2
.
As stated earlier, Gagne predicts that, given a hierarchy
of tasks, transfer will be zero if previously learned pre-
requisites are not recalled, and will range up to 100% if
they are. Therefore, transfer from level to level depends
upon mastery of subordinate concepts. This prediction was
not tested in Neisser and Weene's experiment primarily due
to the nature of their design (repeated measure design).
That is , since relatively few subj ects received all treat-
ments in unspecified order, there was no basis (indeed no
intention) for assessment of hierarchical transfer effects.
To test Gagne' s assumption of mastery of prerequisites
in hierarchical learning tasks, three groups of subjects were
run according to three different criteria: 1. low level of
training, 2. moderate training level, and 3. high level of
training. The theoretical number of trials required to
learn in each level was computed following a model suggested
by Trabasso and Bower (1968). Specifically, given Trabasso's
and Bower's (1968) assumption of equisaliency of dimensions,
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and their calculations of expected error rates in conjunctive
problems of this type, average required trials to mastery
was estimated to be 20. The number thus estimated was used
as the criterion for Group 2. Making this number of trials
equal to n, Groups 1 and 3 received n/2 and 2n trials,
respectively. Table 4 lists the expected number of trials
for each group.
The specific hypothesis tested by this procedure pre-
dicted error rates on subsequent problems to be a decreasing
linear function of prior training criteria. Since Group 1
was advanced to new problems prior to the predicted solution
state (see Table 4) it was predicted that the performance of
subjects in this group would be considerably poorer than that
of subjects in Groups 2 or 3
.
Criterion tests were administered to half of the
subjects immediately following completion of the training
phase for each concept. Thus, after completing the 10 trials
for level 1, half of the subjects in Group 1 received a
criterion test, half did not. A similar split was made for
the criterion groups (Groups 2 and 3). Following completion
of the third concept (level 3 problems) all subjects received
a criterion test. This testing procedure was intended to
control for learning effects in testing.
The experiment was conducted in two phases: a short
"warm-up" session and the training phase itself. The goals
of the "warm-up" session were as follows:
1. Since feedback would be presented via magnetic tape it
was decided that confirmation of the correct response
would be given in terms of the position occupied by the
positive stimulus. Consequently, one of the goals of the
"warm-up" session was to test and/or teach the under-
standing of ordinal position, and the ability to match
the position of the stimuli with the corresponding spaces
provided in the answer sheets.
2. The second objective of the "warm-up" session was to
acquaint subjects with the ultimate goal of the problem,
namely to "guess" which of the stimuli was correct, and t
discover the conceptual rule.
METHOD
Experimental design .
The experiment involved a 4-way repeated measure analysi
of variance design. The repeated measure variable was
represented by the three levels of problems (concepts 1, 2
and 3 ) . The independent group f actors were : training con-
dition
,
with three levels (low, moderate and high levels of
training), transfer conditions, with 2 lines (shift of
attributes and no-shift of attributes), and one test factor
(continuous testing vs. final test only).
Subj ects .
There were 96 S_s from third grade, randomly assigned to
each of the experimental conditions. Subjects were recruited
from elementary schools in Greenfield, Whately and W. Spring-
field. Also, girls and boys were evenly distributed across
treatments
.
Material .
Stimuli were composed of combinations of attributes of
six dimensions . Table 5 lists the six dimensions and their
respective attributes . One particular stimulus could be a
large, green triangle filled in with slashes and with two Xs
at the bottom (borders ) , or a small , blue diamond filled in
with Os and with four Xs at the top and so on.
These stimuli were mounted on 3 5 mm slides such that each
slide was composed of an array of four stimuli . The relevant
Insert Table 5 about here
dimensions for each level and their respective attributes are
described in Table 6, and Figure 2 exhibits one instance of
stimulus-array for each level, as they appeared in the
experiment. As can be seen in Figure 2, the method of pre-
Insert Table 6 about nere
Insert Figure 1 about here
differed from concept
in the first concept
senting the variations in the dimensions
to concept. The three dimensions varied
18
were presented in such a way that all four attributes were
presented in each problem. For the second and third concepts
taught, only two attributes within each dimension were varied
in a given problem.
Except for dimension shape which was made irrelevant for
all problems, all dimensions and attributes were orthogonally
manipulated with the only restriction being that each slide
should contain one and only one positive instance.
Apparatus .
The training and test materials were projected via a 35
mm carousel slide projector on a screen in full view of the S_
Also aside from the introduction and pre-training which was
presented verbally by the E_, all subsequent training and
testing instructions were presented via a magnetic tape
recorder . The S_s responded individually to each of the
training and testing problems by marking their choice in a
response booklet. This response booklet for the training
problems contained one page for each problem. On the page
there were four boxes, one box corresponding to each stimulus
position on the projected screen. When instructed by E_ via
the tape, the S_ selected his choice and indicated same in
his response booklet. He was then informed by E^ what the
correct stimulus choice was for that problem. The S_ was
then directed to observe whether he had chosen correctly.
Procedure .
Each step of this experiment was conducted in two phases
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training and testing. The training phase consisted of a
number of trials with feedback appropriate to the concept
being taught. Testing consisted of blank trials. The experi-
ment was conducted such that eight children were escorted
from their classroom to the experimental room and seated.
They were then instructed to fill out certain information on
the training booklet in front of them. This information
included their name, their age, sex and set number from 1 to
8. They were then given some preliminary instruction con-
cerning the nature of the task in which they were to engage.
This pre-training included a brief instructional unit in which
they were taught how to make responses for specific choices
on the screen and also an introduction as to the nature of
the specific problems that they would be attempting to solve.
Specifically, the children were told that they would be
playing a learning game. Instructions went as follows:
"The nature of the game will be for you to choose
the correct picture when I show you several pic-
tures on the screen like this (the slide projector
was then turned on and four stimulus figures
appeared on the screen). Here we see four
pictures. This is the first picture (the E
points to the leftmost picture); this is the
second picture (he points to the second picture);
this is the third picture and this is the fourth
picture (he points to the rightmost picture). Now
look at the first page of your booklet. Do you see
those four boxes? (E waits for Ss to acknowledge)
Each one of those boxes goes with a pxcture you
see on the screen. The first box would go with
the first picture; the second box would go with
the second picture; the third box would go with the
third picture and the fourth box would go with the
fourth
P
picture. Now, everybody look at the pictures
again. Do you see the circle? (Pause) All right,
20
now suppose that you wanted to choose the circle.
Mark an X on your answer sheet that shows that you
are choosing the circle. (Pause) How many people
chose the third box? Raise your hand if you chose
the third box, (Pause) All right, let's try another
one. Turn over to the next page. (E then projects
a new slide on the screen in which the circle moves
to position 2.) All right, now let's see if you
remember how to play this game. Suppose that you
wanted to choose the circle again. Mark the box
that would show that you are choosing the circle.
How many chose the second box? (Pause) Very good.
All right, let's try once again. (E advances to a new
slide.) Turn to the third page. Now mark the box for
the circle. How many marked the first box? (Pause)
Very good. From now on I'll be talking to you over
the tape recorder but I want you to keep in mind a
few things that are very important. First, this is a
learning game so you want to try to do your best but
you also want to be sure that you do your own work.
Don ' t be concerned with what your neighbor is doing
because he may be doing things wrong. Second, we'll
have a lot of problems to do and each problem goes on
a different page. I'll tell you which page it goes
on so you be sure you look to see that you are on
the correct page. It is very easy to skip a page
and be on the wrong one, so look very carefully.
Third, once you've made a mark for your choice, don't
change it. If you have a problem, simply raise your
hand and we'll help you. All right? Very good. I'll
be talking to you on the tape recorder from now on.
Remember, if you have a problem, just raise your hand".
The rest of the experiment was presented automatically
via the magnetic tape recorder and slide projector. Two E_s
participated in this training, and occasionally a third was
added to assist in the training. For the first five or six
problems, the second IS stood at the front of the room and when
the correct choice was announced via the tape recorder he also
indicated the correct choice by pointing a marker on the
projector screen. The instructions presented on the magnetic
tape recorder initially introduced the S_s to the specific
i
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problems .
"
Initial problems were presented at a fairly stable rate
of 15 seconds observation time and 10 seconds per problem.
For later problems this rate was advanced to roughly 10
seconds observation time and five seconds response and
feedback time (such that four problems per minute were
presented for the later slides in the sequence). The test
items were presented at a fairly stable rate of 15 seconds
per item; there was no feedback interval.
The eight Ss who served simultaneously at each session
of the experiment actually constituted four subgroups of two
Ss each. One subgroup of Ss remained throughout all
activities for a given training condition . That is
,
they
received all training and all test items • The second group
received only the first five of each ten-item test. They
were excused from the room and waited outside after they
completed the first five items for each of the three tests.
The third and fourth groups were excused from the experiment
immediately following training for the first and second
concepts. They were reintroduced after the tests were
completed. All children received the first five items of
the terminal test. However, only the first and third groups
of children received the last five items of the terminal test.
This procedure did not produce any noticeable negative side
effects, particularly with the children who remained throughout
22
nature of the problems they would be solving as follows:
"All right boys and girls, we're now ready to begin.
Now, as we explained to you, the purpose of this
game is to choose the correct picture. Now, when I
show you a problem on the screen, look carefully at
each picture. Then, when I tell you, choose one of
the pictures by making a mark in your booklet.
After everybody has had time to choose the picture,
I'll tell you which picture was right so you can
see if you chose the correct one . Now, theres a
reason why certain pictures are correct and others
are not. When you discover this reason, you'll be
able to get all of the problems right . So this
means that at first you'll get some of the problems
wrong. Don't feel bad but try to find the secret
so you'll get the rest correct. Work quickly but
carefully. Do your own work and don't change any
answers once you've made them. I'll say which page
each problem goes with so you ' 11 be sure that you ' re
not on the wrong page . All right , let ' s begin
.
Here is the problem for page one. You all should be
on the first page of your booklet. See each picture
carefully. Now mark the one that you think is
correct. (Pause) If you marked the third picture,
you were correct. The third picture."
This procedure was repeated for each of the training problems.
The number of problems presented was determined by the learn-
ing condition and the concept level of the particular
training sequence
.
A sample of the instructions given to the children
receiving continuous testing (in this case, the first concept
tested) is given below:
"All right, let's continue with the game only we're
going to play it a little differently than before.
Each of you has a sheet of paper on which you have
written your name. Now I'll show you some problems
just like before and for each problem you are to
choose the picture that you think is correct. How-
ever, I'm not going to tell you which one is correct
for these problems. All right, now I'll tell you
which line you should be on for each of these
the experiment (that is, received all training and testing).
Moreover, the children who did not receive continuous testing
(i.e., were excused from the experiment during the first and
second tests) appeared somewhat upset that they were not able
to participate in everything.
RESULTS
Separate analyses of variance were performed on training
and blank trial (test) data. Also, a conditional analysis
of initial response tendencies was performed on the initial
training trials. The results of these analyses are as follows:
Training data . Responses obtained for the training problems
were tabulated from the response booklets and summarized into
ten-trial blocks for analysis. Differences in performance as
a function of training paradigm (shift vs. no-shift) and level
of training were assessed by means of analysis of variance on
the last ten-item block score. This analysis was performed
across concepts (i.e., the concept was treated as a repeated
measure variable) and the results are summarized in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 about here
These results reveal significant differences attributable
to the level of training (F - 7.24, p< .01), problem complexity
(F = 10.80, p < .01) and a differential effect of training
paradigm on problem complexity (F = 5.01, p < .01) . Specifically,
average performances in terms of the three training levels
were 5.28, 7.06 and 7.02, respectively, indicating that the
principal effect for training level occurs between underlearn-
ing and criterion learning levels.
The mean performance scores as a function of problem
complexity were 7.00 for concept 1, 6.71 for concept 2 and 5.66
for concept 3. Hence, the assumption that the three concepts
are ordered in terms of complexity is supported.
The differential effect of training paradigm on performanc
as a function of problem complexity is displayed in Figure 2.
In this figure, a systematic response decrement occurs for
Insert Figure 2 about here
mean shift performance across concepts. On the other hand, the
no-shift groups display nearly identical mean scores across
concepts
.
No other source of variance attained significance although
the shift groups averaged slightly more correct responses than
the no-shift groups (6.73 vs. 6.18). Recalling that this
difference was greatest on the concept 1 problems (7.75 vs .
6.25), the data were re-examined for evidence of initial stimu-
lus bias. Specifically, the number of responses to "dotted"
(positive attribute for the no-shift groups) and "wavy"
(positive attribute for the shift groups) given by both groups
in trial 1 of concept 1 was examined. An equal saliency of
cues assumption leads to the prediction that responses to trial
1 of concept 1 would be equally distributed among stimuli.
Table 8 displays the actual response pattern to the trial 1
stimuli for each of the two training groups, A chi-square
Insert Table 8 about here
"goodness-of-fit" (to the equal saliency hypothesis) was
performed on these response patterns. The results display a
departure from this distribution at the .001 level for the
2
shift group (X = 100.60) vs. the .20 level for the no-shift
2group (X = 6.16)
.
One possible explanation for these non-uniform response
patterns would be sampling bias. This hypothesis, however, is
unlikely given random assignment to groups (Exact probability
test: p< .001). Another possibility is that pre-training
tended to sensitize the two groups differentially to the
stimuli, yielding the observed patterns. However, this expla-
nation requires the assumption of a within-subject interaction
to this pre-training, since the latter was uniform across Ss .
A third possibility is that, due to the methodology employed
(groups of 8 children presented with the stimuli and record-
ing their own responses in booklets), some Ss delayed
responding until—or corrected their responses following
—
feedback. The assumption that one child out of 5 so behaved
tends to redistribute the first-item responses into parallel
patterns as shown below:
Group
Dotted
Triangle
Wavy
Circle
Starred
Diamond
Slashed
Square
No-shift .15
.67
.08 .10
Shift
.17 .49
.14 .20
However, the circle stimulus still receives excessive
proportion of responses, which can be accounted for in terms
of pre-training sensitization (or carryover). This explanation
receives support upon inspection of trial 2 response data,
as presented in Table 9. Specifically, the unadjusted response
patterns of trial 1 are compared with those of trial 2 for each
group. An approximate decrement of 2 5% in the proportion of
responses to the circle stimulus occurs on trial 2 for both
groups. The proportion of S_s in the shift group which chose
the circle on trial 2 can be used as an estimate of the initial
tendency to adjust choices on the basis of feedback.
It was subsequently decided to block the training groups
in terms of early trial performance patterns. This was done by
blocking the S_s in terms of score (number of correct responses)
on the first ten training trials. Two blocks (score split =
Insert Table 9 about here
5 correct responses) were established and the analysis of last
10 training trials were recomputed separately for each concept.
The method of unweighted means for unequal cells was used, as
suggested by Winer (1962, p. 242).
The results of the concept 1 blocked analysis are summarized
below (Table 10). This analysis displays a significant effect
for training level (F = 7.43, p <.01), block (F = 26.95, p^.01)
Insert Table 10 about. here
and a trend for the training level by block effect (F - 2.42,
p = .08). The main effect for paradigm failed to reach
significance (F = 2.93, p < .10) although the shift group had a
higher mean score than the no-shift group (6.18 vs. 7.07).
The average by training level were 5.38, 6.71 and 7.82, respec-
tively.
Tables 11 and 12 summarize the results of the blocked
Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here
analysis for concepts 2 and 3, respectively. Concept 2 analysis
reveals no significant effect although level of training shows
a very strong trend towards significance (F = 2.97, p<.06).
The mean scores in terms of level of training were 5.64, 7.47
and 6.90, respectively, pointing to a possible superiority of
the criterion learning groups over underlearning groups.
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The results of the analysis of concept 3 show a significant
effect for training level (F = 8.46, p <.001). The specific
mean scores for each respective training level were 3.89,
6.53, and 6.27. All other factors failed to reach significance.
Conditional analysis of inter-concept transfer . Another
analysis was performed on the data to test for specific transfer
from concept to concept, using responses to the first trial of
concepts 2 and 3 as dependent variables. Since the positive
instances for the no-shift groups in concepts 2 and 3 always
contained the same attributes as concept 1 (plus one or two
new attributes), it was hypothesized that Ss from those groups
would make more correct first-trial responses to subsequent
problems than would Ss in the shift groups. A _Z test for
differences between proportions was utilized to evaluate this
hypothesis (Walker and Lev, 1953, p. 77). The proportion of
S^s in the no-shift groups responding correctly in trial 1 of
concepts 2 and 3 was compared to that of Ss in the shift
groups. Table 13 exhibits both the proportions and the results
of the analysis. The obtained Z for each comparison is shown
Insert Table 13 about here
below
:
Concept 2 Concept 3
*
NS vs. SH: Z = .37NS vs. SH: Z = 2.81
LI vs. L2 : Z = -1.62 LI vs. L2: Z = 1.19
*
P < .05
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The analysis indicates a significant difference between
the proportion of Ss responding correctly on trial 1 of
concept 2, the difference favoring the no-shift group. All
other comparisons were non-significant.
Blank trial analysis . The data obtained from the blank trial
inserted at the end of each concept training phase were grouped
and analyzed in terms of the design variables. Two such
analyses were performed: one for the 48 Ss who were tested
across all concepts, and one for the 96 Ss who received the
final test • The analysis of tests across concepts is summarized
in Table 14* These results show a significant effect for
Insert Table 14 about here
concept (F - 4.68, p <.05), the average scores for each parti-
cular concept being 6.04, 6.93 and 5.46, respectively. A
significant interaction was also found for paradigm by concept
(F = 8.82, p £ .001) which is shown graphically in Figure 3. As
the conceptual complexity increases there tends to be an
Insert Figure 3 about here
increment in the performance of the no-shift groups and a
decrement for the shift groups.
Paradigm and training level did not reach significant
30
(both F = 2.82, p < .10) but the average score for the shift
group is slightly higher than the no-shift group (6.78 vs.
5.51) and the averages for training level increase from level
to level (4.98, 6.31 and 7.15).
The analysis of the final test (concept 3) is presented
in Table 15. These results show a significant main effect for
Insert Table 15 about here
training 1Gvel (F = 4.21, p ^ • 0 5 ) such that the average sceres
were 3.88 for level 1, 4.62 for level 2, and 6.15 for level 3.
Although no other effect reached significance, an interesting
interacting trend was observed for paradigm by level. This
trend is presented in Figure 4, and as can be seen, a strong
linear increment as a function of training level occurs for the
no-shift groups, whereas the shift groups display an irregular
pattern.
Insert Figure 4 about here
DISCUSSION
Two major hypotheses were evaluated in the experiment.
The first was related to the possible facilitative effect of a
hierarchical organization of concepts. That is, it was expected
that the no-shift group would perform better than the shift
group in concepts 2 end 3 because of the hierarchical nature of
the problems. For the no-shift group, specific transfer from
concept to concept would yield at least a partial solution
(thus decreasing the likelihood of an error) because the
relevant attribute of each concept would continue to be relevant
in subsequent concepts. Conversely, specific transfer from
concept to concept for the shift group would likely lead to
errors since the relevant attributes were changed from concept
to concept.
The specific transfer hypothesis provided the basis for
predicting superior performance for the no-shift group on
concepts 2 and 3. Since no transfer effects should be apparent
in concept 1, the expectation was that the two paradigm groups
would not differ in performance on this problem. When the
performance of the two paradigm groups are analyzed separately
for each concept (Tables 10 and 11) it is apparent that the
predictions concerning the f acilitative effects of a hierarchi-
cal organization of concepts did not receive support . The
predicted superiority of the no-shift groups over the shift
groups is not present in those results. However, the
analysis of variance for performance across concepts did indi-
cate a significant interaction between paradigm and concept,
both for the training data (Table 7) and blank trials (Table
14). Therefore, some differential effect for treatment did
occur across concepts. The failure to obtain significant main
effects for paradigm may be best examined through the results
of the separate analysis of each concept.
When performances in concept 1 are compared, a significant
difference is found between the no-shift and shift groups, in
favor of the latter. However, as shown in the Results section,
these differences may be explained through a "response corrector"
hypothesis
•
The non-significant difference between the two paradigm
groups in concepts 2 and 3 may be related to the nature of the
problems rather than to paradigm itself. Table 13 shows that
the no-shift groups did show some specific transfer, at least
from concept 1 to concept 2, as attested by a significant Z.
However, Tables 11 and 12 show no main effect for paradigm and
the test for differences of proportions (Table 13) is not
significant for concept 3. The problems for concept 2 pre-
sented three new features in relation to concept 1: (1) the
solution rule shifted from simple presence to conjunction;
(2) each dimension contributed only two attributes in each
slide; and (3) the position of the borders became a varying,
yet irrelevant, dimension. Feature (2) may explain some of the
results obtained
.
It was said above that for concept-2 problems each dimension
contributed only two attributes per slide (see Figure 2).
Therefore, the no-shift groups entered level-2 problems with
a 50% chance of making a correct response (assuming that
transfer from level 1 occurred) since their previous positive
attribute would always be present and reinforced 50% of the
time. Subjects in the shift groups, on the other hand, would
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respond correctly to trial 1 of concept 2 only by ch
(their previous reinforced attribute was not present on this
particular trial). This prediction was supported as indicated
by the analysis in Table 13. The initial advantage of the
no-shift groups over the shift groups, however, was not carried
on since no significant difference was found for paradigm in
concept 2. Given that KCR was being provided S_s in the shift
group would be cued to the correct solution in early trials.
Once one of the elements of the conjunction had been identi-
fied, those 3s, too, would have a 50% chance of making a
correct response. Moreover, if concept-2 problems did not
present great difficulty, the initial advantage of the no-shift
groups would not be strong enough to act as a factor (especially
in the last two levels of training conditions where only the
last ten-item block was used for purposes of analysis).
The lack of significant differences between paradigms
for concept 3 also seems to be due to the nature of the
problems. The results in Table 12 indicate no difference
between the no-shift and shift groups as to their responses
to trial 1 of concept 3. Contrary to what happened in concept-2
problems, the no-shift groups had a 75% chance of making an
incorrect response against a 25% chance of being correct, on
trial 1 of concept 3. This was so because in concept-3
problems the two values contributed by each dimension were
unevenly distributed (3 "green" vs. 1 "red"; 3 "circles" vs.
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1 "square", etc.). Furthermore, concept-3 problems seemed
to have involved a double complexity. That is, besides
requiring the conjunction of four attributes, the problems
involved border and position as relevant dimensions. Inci-
dental verbal reports from Ss after the experiment was over
tended to indicate that position of the borders was very seldom
attended to or attended to only in later trials. If that is
actually the case, it is conceivable that the predicted super-
iority of the no-shift group towards the shift group may have
been overcome by a very complex task. This interpretation seems
to be supported by the fact that the only strong difference
between the two criterion learning groups (L2 and L3 ) is found
in concept 3 (Table 15).
The second major hypothesis evaluated in the experiment
was related to the effects of the different levels of training
conditions for each concept. As it may be recalled, the
theoretical number of trials required for mastery of each
concept was computed and three groups were formed according to
the number of trials allowed during the training phase. The
three groups corresponded to a low level of training (LI), a
medium level (L2), and a high level of training (L3). It was
predicted that the last two groups would outperform the low
level groups in all concepts.
These predictions seem to have received support from the
analyses of the training data (Tables 7, 10, 11 and 12)
as well
V
as test data (Table 15). The analyses shown in Table 14
(test data) did not reveal a significant effect for training
condition but the trend observed (p < .08) points in the
predicted direction.
Implications and Conclusions
A thorough evaluation of the hypotheses concerning the
effects of a hierarchical organization of concepts has to take
into consideration variables that bear on methodological
aspects of the research. These variables have already been
discussed in previous sections but their importance to further
developments on the issue calls for a general review.
As may be recalled, the problems given to each paradigm
group across the levels of conceptual complexity were com-
parable in the sense that (1) both groups received, at each
level, problems which were defined by the same conceptual
rule; and (2) at each particular level both groups had the
same dimensions as relevant , the attributes being different
.
However, a more powerful test of the effects of the hierarchi-
cal organization of concepts would be obtained if the two
groups received the same problems at level 3. Such factors
as stimulus preference-- if existent- -might be eliminated in a
design where the three levels of complexity aimed to a final
task which was common to both no-shift and shift groups.
The reliability of the training data was somewhat decreased
due to the methodology used. In fact, there is no guarantee
that Ss did not change their response following feedback.
Two aspects of the procedure employed account for the un-
reliability of the training data. First, Ss recorded their
own responses in the booklet. Since Ss were run in groups,
it became quite difficult to prevent the changing of responses
in spite of the fact that S_s were instructed not to do so.
Second, after all Ss had (supposedly) made their choice
and recorded their responses, knowledge of correct results
(KCR) was provided. Therefore, Ss were not only told whether
or not their response was correct but also which response was
correct . The precision of response recording might be
increased either by running Ss individually ( thus increasing
the control of _E over S_) or by transferring the actual record-
ing of responses from S_s to either E_ or some mechanical device.
Also, the use of a simple "correct-incorrect" feedback system
might make it less tempting to S_s to change incorrect responses
A final remark should be made as to the actual stimuli
used. The inferences drawn from the pattern of responses
obtained from no-shift and shift groups at concept 1 might have
been clearer if the problems used during the pre-training
phase were unrelated to the experimental stimuli. As it may
be recalled, one of the hypotheses suggested to explain the
discrepancies found between the two groups on concept 1 was
the fact that Ss might have been sensitized to respond to the
circle. Furthermore, it might be helpful to know Ss' behavior
towards the experimental dimensions before engaging in the
actual research. In the present research, the
hypothesis
37
of a stimulus preference cannot be ruled out completely, even
though it seems unlikely that that has been the case.
References
38
Archer , E . J. , Bourne , L . E
.
, Jr. & Brown , P. G. Concept
identification as a function of irrelevant information
as instructions
.
Journal of Experimental Psychology
,
1955, 49, 153-154.
d Battig, W. F. & Bourne, L. E • , Jr. Concept identification
as a function of intra- and inter-dimensional variability.
Journal of Experimental Psychology
, 1961, 61, 4, 329-333.
Bourne, L. E., Jr. & Haygood, R. C. The role of stimulus
redundancy in concept identification. Journal of
Experimental Psychology
,
1959, 58, 23 2-238.
Bourne, L. E., Jr. Concept attainment. In Theodore R. Dixon
& David L . Horton (Eds.), Verbal behavior and general
behavior theory . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968,
chap. 10.
"^Bourne, L. E., Jr. & Guy, D. E. Learning conceptual rules:
I. Some interrule transfer effects. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology , 1968, 70, 3, 423-429.
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J. & Austin, G. A. A study of
thinking . New York: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956.
Emrick, J. A. & Adams, E. N. An evaluation model for individual-
ized instruction . Research Report R.C. 2674 — Thomas
Watson Research Center, Yorktown,Hts . , N.Y., October, 1969.
Emrick, J. A. The validation of an evaluation mode l for
individualized instruction . USOE Research Grant, DEG
1. 71-000 2 (509) , September, 19 70
.
39
Gagne, R
•
M. The acquisition of knowledge. Psychological
Review
,
1962a, 69, 4, 355-365.
Gagne, R. M.
,
Mayor, J. R.
, Garsterns , H. L. & Paradise, N. E.
Factors in acquiring knowledge of a mathematical task.
Psychological Monographs
, 1962b, 76 (7, Whole No. 526).
Gagne, R. M. The conditions of learning
. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1965.
Gagne, R. M. The learning of principles. In Herbert
Klausmeier & Chester W. Harris (Eds.), Analysis of
concept learning
. New York: Academic Press, 1966.
) Gagne, R. M. Contributions of learning to human development.
Psychological Review
, 1968, 75, 3, 177-191.
Harlow, H. Learning set and error factor theory. In S. Koch
(Ed.), Psychology, A study of a science
, vol. 2., New
York : McGraw-Hill , 1959
.
O Haygood, R. C. & Bourne, L. E
.
, Jr. Attribute- and rule-
learning aspects of conceptual behavior . Psycho log ic al
Review
,
1965, 72, 3, 175-195.
Hovland, C. I. & Weiss, W. Transmission of information con-
cerning concepts through positive and negative instances
.
Journal of Experimental Psychology
,
1953, 45, 175-182.
Myers, J. L. Fundamentals of experimental design . Boston:
Allyn & Bacon, 1966.
0 Neisser, U. & Weene, P. Hierarchies in concept attainment.
Journal of Experimental Psychology , 1962, 64, 6, 640-
645.
40
Trabasso, T • & Bower, G. H. Attention in learning: theory
and research
. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968.
Walker, C. M. & Bourne, L. E .
,
Jr; The identification of
concepts as a function of amounts of irrelevant and
relevant information . American Journal of Psychology
,
1961, 74, 410-417.
Walker, H. M. & Lev, J. Elementary statistical methods .
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958.
Winer , B . J . Statistical principles in experimental design .
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
41
PQ
<
EH
u
o
o
Eh
Eh
H
OH
Eh
<
a.
o
a.
o
CO
oH
Eh
H
Eh
<
H
PQ
H
U
CO
p
CO
Eh
a
o
u
9
JJ
d)
M\—
/
,
—
1
A-i
j J
fl)
M_jTl
ow fl)
o {/I rd
•rH My
jj rH
Q. >—
<
•iH (jM
tlM fl)
[ )W rS JJ
rn JJ
fl) rrl
CI)
tjM
,
—
|
rd
rd
o y} rd
Cj
<H r*V-4 r—
'
(U CjrH tY\J
Tf\
IjJ JJ X5
C£ rd >
—
i
•*s o, rd
i
—*
ct X* X3
LA flj CD
HOi—
i
rH rH
rH
< <
P
CO
[Jl-M
L '
)
s
1 1
1 1
Eh
Eh
<
rj
V-/
•iH •iH
JJ JJ
rd r
)
w c:c. r*>—
i
M
•H
>—?
T 1 r!>—
<
Uh O
< u
rH
0)
U
rd
x
jj
o
X
U
o
flj
u
rd
-a
rd
CD
u
OJ
SH
rd
0
•H
5
SH
CU •
JJ W
-P d)
fd rH
a, a
rH x
o
•H
H-»
u
a
3
W
•iH
XJ
cD
>
to
rH
u
c:
H
ro
OJ
a) 5H
OJ
OJ rd OJ
9 M
rd
sq
rd
O >i o CD
-P OJ -p SH
OJ
to o rd
-p OJ
u rH
rd Mh a M to
•H O
ro
to > X o
rH OJ OJ
OJ a u
JQ o OJ n
H -p OJ
-P rd o ^H
to
rd SH
e OJ OJ
M oj s:
JJ •rH jC -p
•rH
-P 4J •H
to o H CD
c OJ OJ
CD rH
OJ OJ OJ
-P u U U
fD rd rd rd
XJ X
flj OJ J^ x:
U U U u
CD H •H H
to U x: X2
•H rd 5 5
M •
OJ CD
-P rH
-P Pa
rd B
a rd
X
rd (U
H rd
(0
d
SH
OJ
-P
JJ •
rd OJ
U
rd
CD CT
1
to
to
CD
-P •
-P -P
rd a
04 oj
u
rH C
f—I O
< u
to to
C OJ
SH rH
CD
-P E
jj rd
rd X
P-i OJ
rH OJ
r—1 SH
< fd
CO
a
SH
OJ
jj to
JJ OJ
rd rH
rH X
< CD
OJ
*H
rd
CD
u
rd
to
4J
O
c
X3
CJ
M
CD
U
rd
X!
u
H
X
to
Sh
OJ •
-P to
-P OJ
fd rH
a a,
rH rd
rH X
< OJ
rH
fd
•rl
OJ
rH t3
rd rH
rH OJ rd
rd 0 > •rH
•rl •rl c a
o -P a -P OJ o
•rH •rH 0 rd xs •rl
-p X3 •H to
•H a jp u jp 0
o rd OJ a rH
a u -P •H U
o •rH OJ rH O X
o PQ < rj w
LO UJ GO
a)
»
x
jj
o
x
-p
o
c
-p
X
OJ
u
fd
CO
U
O
XJ
CD
OJ
SH
fd
X
u
•rH
X
CO
E3
U
CD
-P to
JJ OJ
rd rH
a a
rH rf
rH X
< OJ
o
•rl
-P
u
•r-1
to
•rl
XJ
OJ
>
•rl
to
rH
U
X
u
TABLE 2
TYPES OF ATTRIBUTES WHICH CAN BE DEFINED BY
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF TWO FEATURES
Level
Name and
symbolic designation
Description of
positive instance
I
Presence (A) A must be present
Absence ( -A) A must not be present
Conjunction ( A. B) Both A and B must be present
Dis j unction ( AvB
)
Either A or B or both must
be present*
Exclusion ( A. -B)
f,
A must be present and B not
present
II Disjunctive absence
(-Av-B) Either A or B or both must
be absent
Conjunctive absence
(-A.-B) A and B must both be absent.
Implication ( -AvB) A may be absent but if A is
present then B must be also;
thus A implies B.
Either/or ( A. -B ) v( -A. B) Either A or B must be
-J--J--J.
present but not both
" together.
Both/neither (A.B) v Both A and B must be
(-A.B) present, unless neither is
Modified from Neisser and Weene, 1962.
In fact, there are five pairs of complimentary rules rather
than ten different rules.
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF TRIALS FOR EACH LEARNING
CONDITION ON EACH LEVEL
Level
Learning condition I II in
1 • Underlearning 10 10 20
2 . Learning to criterion 20 20 40
3. Overlearning 40 40 80
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FIGURE 1 Sample problems for the different
coneeptual rul e s .
TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE LAST
10 TRAINING TRIALS OF EACH CONCEPT
SOURCE DFJ—' J. ss MS F
Between
P 1 21.67 21.67 1.5
L 2 198.42 99.21 7.2**
PL 2 4.67 2.34 .2
S/PL 90
1
1234.65 13 . 72
Within
C 2 95.92 47.96 10.8* *
PC 2 45.09 27.54 5.0**
LC 4 . 31.59 7.89 1.8
PLC 4 11.85 2.96 .7
SC/PL 180 799.54 4.44
**p < .001
P = paradigm
L = level of training
C = concept
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TABLE 8
RESPONSE PATTERNS OF THE SHIFT AND NO-SHIFT
GROUPS TO THE TRIAL 1 TRAINING STIMULI
Group
Varying
dimension 1 2 3 4
Pattern Dotted Wavy Starred Slashed
Shape Triangle Circle Diamond Square
Size Large Small Large Small
NO-SHIFT .37 .29 .16 .18
SHIFT .00 .87 .05 .08
PREDICTED* .25 .25 .25 .25
*
(Assuming equal saliency of cues)
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TABLE 9
RESPONSE PATTERNS OF THE SHIFT AND NO-SHIFT GROUPS
TO TRIALS 1 AND 2 of CONCEPT 1
Trial 1 Group Stimulus description (varying dimensions)12 3 4
Dotted Wavy Starred Slashed
Triangle Circle Diamond Square
Large Small Large Small
NS .37 .29 .16 .18
SH .00 .87 .05 .08
Trial 2 Group Stimulus description (varying dimensions)12 3 4
Starred Dotted Slashed Wavy
Circle Diamond Triangle Square
Large Small Small Large
NS .08 .45 .33 .08
SH .50 .07 .08 .35
TABLE 10
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE LAST TEN
TRAINING TRIALS OF CONCEPT 1
SOURCE DF ss MS F
L 2 84.61 42.30 7.43*
- P i 16. 72 16.72 2.94
B i 153 .45 153.45 26.95*
LP 2 3.83 1.92
LB 2 27.62 13 .81 2.42
PB 1 6.51 6.51 1.14
LPB 2 3.29 1.64
S/LPB 84 478.27 5.69
*p < .001
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TABLE 11
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE LAST TEN
TRAINING TRIALS OF CONCEPT 2
Source DF SS MS F
L 2 49.27 24.63 2.97
P 1 5.78 5.78
B 1 12.61 12.61 1.52
LB 2 2.64 1.32
LP 2 2.71 1.35
PB 1 1.18 1.18
LPB 2 4.80 2.40
S/LPB 84 696.79 8.29
TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE LAST TEN
TRAINING TRIALS OF CONCEPT 3
Source DF SS MS F
L 2 118.35 59.17 8.46*
P 1 5.36 5.36
B 1 10.66 10.66 1.52
LP 2 3.69 1.84
LB 2 18.88 9.44 1.35
PB 1 1.18 1.18
LPB 2 32.61 16.30 2.33
S/LPB 84 587.59 6.99
*p < .001
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TABLE 13
PROPORTION OF CORRECT RESPONSES ON TRIAL
1 OF CONCEPTS 2 AND 3
f~* oC 2 C 3
NS SH TOT. NS SH TOT.
Ll .87 .31 .59 .25 .12 .18
L2 .87 .75 .81 .31 .62 .46
L3 .81 .56 .68 .43 .43 .43
TOT. .85 .54 .33 .39
TABLE 14
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE
BLANK TRIALS OF EACH CONCEPT
Source DF SS MS
Between
P 1 57.51 57.51 2.82
L 2 114.67 57.33 2.82
PL 2 70.39 35.19 1.73
S/PL 42 854.04 20.33
Within
C
PC
LC
PLC
CS/PL 84 478.08 5.69
2 53.29 26.65 4.68*
2 100.26 50.13 8.82**
4 37.54 9.38 1.64
4 30.15 7.54 1.32
p < .05
* *
p < .001
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TABLE 15
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
BLANK TRIALS (CONCEPT 3)
Source DF SS MS F
P 1 10 .01 10.01 .97
T, 2 86.52 43.26 4.21*r • C I-
T 1 38.76 38.76 3.77
PL 2 38.02 19.01 1.85
PT 1 2.34 2.34
LT 2 12.27 6.13
PLT 2 18.19 9.09
S/LPT 84 861.62 10.26
*
p < .05
T = test condition: continuous (TL) or final (T2).

